From control to capacity to govern: addressing open source's own weaknesses

One of six themes that emerged from the EOLE 2026 online kick-off workshop (25 June). Background: see the kick-off topic.

Why it matters for sovereignty. Much of the sovereignty discussion is not about control but about the capacity to govern: the ability to manage, adapt, audit and run your digital infrastructure, the way GDPR and the AI Act frame it for data and AI systems. Open source increases that capacity, but only if its own weaknesses are addressed.

What came up at the workshop. Two sides of the same coin. On one side, what open source brings: licensing rights, independence, the ability to audit and decide. On the other, if openness is to be a structural element of digital sovereignty (personal, regional, national, EU), then sustainability, underfunding, vulnerabilities and uneven maturity must be tackled with explicit mitigating measures, the gap that proprietary contracts usually paper over. This is also the direction of the EU’s emerging sovereignty strategy. And it loops back to the definition debate: because “open source” means different things (licensing, sustainability, governance, security), each element must be addressed on its own terms. One sharp formulation from the board: there is no way to say whether an IT infrastructure and its software are “sovereign” without a universally recognised, trustworthy checklist to procure and audit systems, software plus infrastructure. Related board items: the meaning of “structural sovereignty”, attaching a strategic value to projects regardless of headcount, Open Source Steward institutionalisation, the EU Stack, data sovereignty in practice, cloud supply chains.

What already exists to build on. SBOM tooling and compliance automation; CHAOSS metrics to understand the communities behind projects; the Sovereign Tech Fund; governance analogies from GDPR and the AI Act; the EU’s emerging sovereignty / open source strategy.

Open questions. Which concrete mitigating measures de-risk open source as infrastructure (security, maintenance, funding)? Can “structural sovereignty” be defined usefully? Can we draft a trustworthy checklist for procuring and auditing “sovereign” systems? How to score the strategic value of fundamental but forgotten projects?

How to contribute. Reply below with metrics, checklists, frameworks and cases, ideally by end of September 2026. Rapporteurs welcome for the Barcelona event (November 2026): volunteer by replying below or by direct message on this forum. Possible outputs: a “capacity to govern” framing note and a draft sovereignty audit checklist.

Hello all,

Several developments in 2026 bear on the risk and checklist questions. We meet on Friday 27 November 2026 at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona (registration is free, see EOLE 2026 – EOLE).

ENISA put the CRA Single Reporting Platform online on 11 September. Manufacturers now report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents affecting the security of their products. Open source stewards get their own, narrower reporting obligations from 11 December 2027 (CRA Articles 24(3) and 71(2)): The CRA Single Reporting Platform is launched | ENISA

On sovereignty criteria, the Commission’s Cloud and AI Development Act proposal of 3 June sets four assurance levels (Article 16, Annex II). SBOM requirements start at level 2, source code audits of security-relevant third-country components apply at levels 2 and 3, and level 4 adds the exclusion of third-country effective control over design, development, maintenance and evolution. The text is still before Parliament and Council: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10104-2026-ADD-1/en/pdf

On supply chain, Wiz (Merav Bar and Rami McCarthy, 4 August) traced the keyv and cacheable worm to a compromised maintainer GitHub account; their count reached more than 400 distinct npm packages: keyv and cacheable npm Package Hijacked in Supply Chain Attack | Wiz Blog

On the policy side, Sachiko Muto (OpenForum Europe), in OpenUK’s report of 23 July, reads the EU Open Source Strategy as a statement of intent rather than a legal instrument; the procurement reform she was waiting for arrived on 9 September as COM(2026) 590: https://openuk.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/The-EU-Open-Source-Policy.pdf

One concrete question for participants: which single control in a procurement or audit checklist would have limited the damage of the keyv incident?

Benjamin, for the EOLE committee